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Abstract
Gene-culture co-evolution emphasizes the joint role of culture and genes for the emergence of altruistic and cooperative
behaviors and behavioral genetics provides estimates of their relative importance. However, these approaches cannot
assess which biological traits determine altruism or how. We analyze the association between altruism in adults and the
exposure to prenatal sex hormones, using the second-to-fourth digit ratio. We find an inverted U-shaped relation for left
and right hands, which is very consistent for men and less systematic for women. Subjects with both high and low digit
ratios give less than individuals with intermediate digit ratios. We repeat the exercise with the same subjects seven months
later and find a similar association, even though subjects’ behavior differs the second time they play the game. We then
construct proxies of the median digit ratio in the population (using more than 1000 different subjects), show that subjects’
altruism decreases with the distance of their ratio to these proxies. These results provide direct evidence that prenatal
events contribute to the variation of altruistic behavior and that the exposure to fetal hormones is one of the relevant
biological factors. In addition, the findings suggest that there might be an optimal level of exposure to these hormones
from social perspective.
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Introduction
Human societies are built on cooperation and social norms [1–3].
It is thus important to understand the origins and determinants of
prosocial behavior in humans. Gene-culture co-evolution stresses
the joint role of culture and genes for the emergence of altruistic and
cooperative traits [4,5] and behavioral genetics has recently
provided estimates of their relative importance, by comparing
monozygotic twins who share 100% of their genes with dizygotic
twins who share 50% of genes on average [6–8]. The limitation of
these approaches is that they are unable to disentangle which
particular biological traits determine individual differences in
prosociality and how they are related [9]. The prominent or at-
risk individuals can be those for whom the traits have low or large
values, or a non-monotonic association may exist. Non-monotonic-
ity may be particularly important in case of biological traits, since
they are shaped by evolutionary forces toward ‘‘optimal’’ values
[10–12] and deviations from these values in any direction might
matter. Such an argument is supported by Nye et al. [13] who find
systematic non-monotonic associations between digit ratio and
several measures of academic performance.
To determine which traits matter and how is crucial to further
understanding of the origins and individual variation of human
prosociality, to the interpretation of correlations between prosocial
behavior and neural activities in the brain, and to any policy
targeting prosociality, cooperation and participation in the
commons.
We analyze whether altruism [14–16] may be shaped by
exposure to prenatal sex hormones. The exposure to male and
female sex hormones in uterus around the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy has large organizing effects on human brain
development [17]. Since the neuroeconomic evidence detects that
the activity in specific brain areas such as the striatum or insula
correlates with altruistic behavior [18–20], different exposure to
prenatal hormones, especially testosterone or oestrogen, may affect
these areas. We thus suspect that exposure to fetal hormones may
shed light on why some people are more or less selfish.
We use giving in the Dictator Game (DG) as a measure of
altruism and both left- and right-hand second-to-fourth digit ratio
(2D:4D) as a biomarker of exposure to fetal sex hormones. DG is a
situation, in which one subject, Dictator, decides the division of a
fixed amount of money (5J in our experiment) between herself
and another anonymous person, Receiver. The Dictator can hold
the whole amount for herself or she can share any part of the
money with the Receiver. Since giving is costly for the Dictator
and the Receiver cannot affect the proposed distribution,
Dictators’ giving is interpreted as an act of altruism and the
amount given to the Receiver serves as a measure of Dictators’
altruism. Since Dictators do not know the identity of Receivers
(and viceversa), altruism is therefore interpreted here as the
willingness to share voluntarily with unknown individuals at
subjects’ cost in a reciprocity-free environment.
2D:4D is calculated as the ratio between the lengths of index
and ring fingers and it has been documented that 2D:4D is
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inversely related to high exposure to testosterone and low exposure
to oestrogen while in uterus [21–25].
Due to hormone exposure, men have lower 2D:4D’s than
women [25]. Many studies thus limit their analysis to one gender
only (e.g. [26]). Others in turn report that 2D:4D predicts the
analyzed behavioral outcomes in men and not women or viceversa
(e.g. [27]). The interplay of gender and experimental altruism is
controversial: evidence exists that women give more than men, but
this effect does not seem to be particularly robust (see [28] for an
extensive review). Other papers note that women are more
sensitive to the price of altruism [29] and are more expected to be
fair [30]. In fact, Croson and Gneezy [28] conclude that women
are more ‘‘inequality averse’’ and that ‘‘women’s decisions are more
context-specific’’ (p. 458). With these considerations in mind, we
carefully analyze gender differences in the analysis below.
As for altruistic behavior, Millet and Dewitte [31] find both
negative and positive relationships between giving and 2D:4D,
depending on the mood they induce in their subjects, but they do
not compare their results to any neutral control treatment and do
not incentivize their subjects. Buser [32] finds positive correlation
between 2D:4D and giving in DG, but he uses a self-reported
index of 2D:4D and binary version of DG. This generates an
imprecise measure of 2D:4D and precludes from exploiting
nonlinearities. Other studies analyze the effects of 2D:4D on
strategic behavior in Ultimatum, Public Good and/or Trust
Games [32–36]. The ratio is also negatively related to certain types
of asocial behavior such as aggression and some disorders
associated with lower socialization such as autism, verbal fluency
and depression (see [25] for a review), suggesting negative
association between altruism and 2D:4D. Nevertheless, the
differing conclusions across studies emphasize the extreme
importance of sampling entire distributions, sufficiently large
sample sizes and robustness analysis of reported findings.
In light of the above evidence, we conjecture that 2D:4D may
be helpful in predicting individual altruism. In particular, due to
above contradictory evidence we suspect that the association
between fetal exposure and willingness to give might not be linear
but non-monotonic. Moreover, we conjecture that this association
will be gender-specific.
Methods
General Information
A total of 193 first-year undergraduate students participated in
at least one of our experimental sessions during one academic
year. The subjects were first-year undergraduate students (fresh-
men) of Economics at the University of Granada, Spain. The study
was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Universidad de
Granada and all subjects provided informed written consent (IC).
The IC explains the content of the experiment they will perform
and the payoffs attached to their performance. Anonymity was
also assured and the Spanish law regarding data protection briefly
explained.
The DGs were run twice with the same group of undergraduate
students: (i) in the first week of their first academic year (before
they get to know their classmates) in October 2010 and (ii) at the
end of the academic year (after developing social relationships and
after potentially learning from the first DG) in May 2011.
Henceforth, we label each session 2010 and 2011, respectively. In
both 2010 and 2011, all the four sections of the first year were
visited and students were invited to participate in an economic
experiment involving money. The participation was voluntary.
Any individual who did not want to participate was allowed to
leave the class before each session. Those willing to participate
were seated separately, each with enough space to preserve
anonymity, and they were provided with written instructions. We
followed procedures similar to Bran˜as-Garza et al. [37]. First, we
elicit their within-class social ties (without providing any incentives)
and consequently invited them to play the DG. Each subject
played the DG as the Dictator, dividing 5J between herself and
another randomly chosen individual from the list of all the
participants of the experiment (independently of the attended
section). Subjects were informed that each participant would
potentially be either a Dictator or Recipient (but not both of them)
with one half probability. Giving was expressed in real money up
to two decimals.
After the experiment, subjects were invited one by one to an
office for the payment and the scanning of their both hands. Both
hands were scanned with a high-resolution scanner (Canon Slide
90). To determine 2D:4D, we measured the lengths of the index
and ring digits on both hands from basal crease to the finger tip.
To ensure the most accurate measurement, we measured the ratio
from the scanned pictures twice. The first measurement was made
right after the scanning, while the second was performed 14
months later, in January 2012. The data reported in this study use
the average of both measures. The correlation between the
average and the first (second) measure on the right hand is 0.97
(0.97) (pv0:0001 in both cases). The figures are 0.93 and 0.93,
resp. (pv0:0001) for left hands. As a robustness check, all the
analysis was repeated using each measure separately and the
results were unaffected.
We completed a sample of 173 and 148 participants in 2010
and 2011, respectively; 129 subjects participated in both sessions.
Some subjects were excluded from the below analysis though.
First, to ensure ethnical homogeneity, three non-Caucasian
subjects were excluded from our data set. One of them only
participated in 2010, one only in 2011, while the third participated
in both. Their inclusion into the data set does not affect any of our
results. Second, we do not include other 19 Caucasian subjects
who participated in 2011 but not in 2010. They had no previous
experience with the game and their behavior would not thus be
comparable to the ‘‘experienced’’ subjects. Indeed, these 19 non-
experienced Caucasian participants give on average 1.59J more
than other Caucasian participants in 2011 (pv0:0001). Third,
since one male subject had his left-hand index finger broken in the
past, we exclude him from the left-hand analysis. In sum, the
analysis of right hands accounts for 171 subjects in 2010 (76
females) and 127 subjects in 2011 (58 females), whereas the left-
hand data contain one male subject less. Women represent
44.44% of the sample 2010. 139 (out of 171) subjects reported
their age; the average and median age in 2010 were 18.97 and 18
years, respectively (st.dev. 3.79; range between 18 and 60). The
composition is similar in 2011.
Each participant was assigned a random identification number
prior to the scanning and received a plastic card with an ID
number. They were advised to keep it as their identification in
future experiments and it served as an ID to record the
experimental data and the digit ratios. In May 2011, we again
visited the four classes and repeated the same experimental
procedure (except the hand scanning). The data on altruism and
digit ratios are available upon request from the authors.
The above data were combined with other characteristics of
subjects collected in additional sessions. In April 2011, we ran the
risk aversion session via an incentivized Holt and Laury’s [38]
protocol and at the beginning of June we invited the subjects to fill
a questionnaire eliciting other characteristics, such as time
preferences, socio-economic status etc., used as controls in the
present study (see Econometric Approach).
Digit Ratio and Altruism
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In Discussion, we combine our results with a larger sample of
digit ratios elicited one year later to be able to complement the
analysis with a representative distribution of digit ratios in the
population. The procedure of elicitation was identical as described
above and we account for 440 males and 577 females in the
sample. See the next section for details.
Econometric Approach
To provide a rigorous statistical analysis of the experimental
results, we perform a series of estimations. The dependent
variables are all based on Dictators’ giving in any of our sessions.
Since there is evidence that people take from others in DGs if it is
allowed [39] and giving is restricted to be non-negative in our
experiment, our dependent variable is truncated from below by
zero and we use censored regression analysis. All reported
estimations were also reproduced using simple linear regression
and using a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable.
The results are very similar and thus not reported here.
In particular, three types of models are estimated according to
the dependent variable:
1. Dictators’ giving in 2010 and 2011: continuous dependent
variable (2 decimal places) censored from below by 0, cross-
section, censored regression analysis, Tables 1 and 2.
2. Dictators’ giving in both 2010 and 2011: continuous dependent
variable (2 decimal places) censored from below by 0, cross-
section and two periods, censored random-effect panel-data
analysis, Table 3.
3. The change of behavior from 2010 to 2011, calculated as Dictators’
giving in 2010 minus Dictators’ giving in 2011: continuous
dependent variable (2 decimal places) censored from below by
25 and above by 5, censored regression analysis (no censored
observation in the data), Table 4.
Each model is reported under eight different specifications: six
models with the complete data set, (a)–(f), one model for the
subsample of men, and one for women, (male) and (female). The
structure of the independent variables is the same in the four
specifications. The regressions are mainly focused on the role of
2D:4D, 2D:4D2, gender and risk aversion [27,40–43]. In
estimations (f), we also control for other variables that have been
documented to influence either the 2D:4D and/or giving in the
Table 1. Dictator giving and digit ratio (2010), censored regression.
Right-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D 3:17
(0:27)
408:03
(0:00)
417:57
(0:00)
433:1
(0:00)
573:13
(0:00)
659:72
(0:00)
539:00
(0:03)
609:28
(0:00)
2D:4D2 {211:57
(0:00)
{216:9
(0:00)
{225:82
(0:00)
{300:3
(0:00)
{342:00
(0:00)
{282:38
(0:03)
{316:99
(0:00)
Female 0:18
(0:33)
{2:76
(0:63)
{3:77
(0:56)
{0:27
(0:96)
Fem.*2D:4D 3:08
(0:61)
4:16
(0:53)
0:5
(0:93)
Risk Aver. 0:08
(0:26)
1:18
(0:25)
0:04
(0:74)
0:12
(0:14)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 171 171 171 171 149 107 88 61
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.036 0.065 0.019 0.087
p (model) 0.263 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.000 0.113 0.003
Left-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D 0:21
(0:94)
278:88
(0:02)
269:04
(0:02)
320:07
(0:01)
337:79
(0:01)
400:38
(0:00)
602:52
(0:00)
{326:10
(0:11)
2D:4D2 {143:96
(0:02)
{139:03
(0:02)
{167:82
(0:01)
{177:63
(0:01)
{211:02
(0:00)
{315:46
(0:00)
169:71
(0:11)
Female 0:14
(0:47)
{11:36
(0:05)
{12:56
(0:06)
{11:25
(0:01)
Fem.*2D:4D 11:91
(0:04)
13:15
(0:05)
11:80
(0:01)
Risk Aver. 0:03
(0:67)
0:60
(0:52)
{0:02
(0:84)
0:15
(0:11)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 170 170 170 170 148 106 87 61
Pseudo-R2 0 0.012 0.012 0.020 0.023 0.044 0.046 0.033
p (model) 0.939 0.056 0.098 0.034 0.063 - 0.005 0.137
p-values in parentheses. Constants non-reported: non-significant in (top a) (p = 0.58), in (bottom a) and (bottom f) (p.0.12), significant otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.t001
Digit Ratio and Altruism
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DG: intelligence [27], academic performance [44], time prefer-
ences [45], position in the class network [37,46] and socioeco-
nomic status.
As mentioned above, we combine our data with a different data
set (see Discussion), where each gender-specific median, 2gD : 4D, is
used as a proxy for the population median. These medians are
0:954 for males’ and 0:967 for females’ right hands; the
corresponding left-hand counterparts are 0:961 and 0:969,
respectively. We used these numbers as proxies for the median
2D:4D in the population and relate giving in the DG to the
deviation, in absolute terms, of individual 2D:4D from gender-
specific population median 2D:4D’s. The deviation variable in the
estimated models in Table 5 is D2D:4D–2gD : 4DD and (2D:4D–
2gD : 4D)2is the deviation squared. There are three types of models
depending on the way the deviation variable enter the regression
and whether controls are included or not: (i) linear term alone (a–b)
(ii) both linear and quadratic terms (c–d ), (c) quadratic term alone
(e–f ). We also report the best estimations separated for men and
women. The other regressors coincide with Tables 1–4.
In all regressions, we report p-values based on estimated robust
standard errors corrected for possible correlations within students
from the same sections, as these individuals may have been under
the influence of common factors and are more likely to know each
other. In case of 2010 results (Table 1), the standard errors are
robust but assumed uncorrelated (as people did not have time to
know each other), but controlling for possible intra-section
correlations has no effect on the regressions.
Results
Dictators’ Giving
Figure 1 summarizes Dictators’ giving in the experiment in
2010 (left, N~171) and 2011 (right, N~127). In 2010, the
average Dictators’ giving is 32.4% out of 5J, while they give on
average 17.8% in 2011. Subjects are more selfish in 2011 than in
2010 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: ZW~6:14, pv0:0001; any
other test leads to the same conclusion). On average, people gave
0.71J (44.2%) less in 2011 than in 2010.
Table 2. Dictator giving and digit ratio (2011), censored regression.
Right-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D 9:91
(0:00)
301:18
(0:00)
308:74
(0:00)
302:71
(0:00)
416:4
(0:00)
449:83
(0:00)
114:59
(0:63)
672:5
(0:03)
2D:4D2 {151:97
(0:00)
{156:7
(0:00)
{152:96
(0:00)
{213:5
(0:00)
{236:86
(0:00)
{54:94
(0:65)
{346:8
(0:03)
Female 0:42
(0:39)
2:6
(0:8)
{0:48
(0:95)
{1:59
(0:86)
Fem.*2D:4D {2:27
(0:83)
0:84
(0:92)
2:24
(0:82)
Risk Aver. 0:32
(0:00)
{1:86
(0:41)
0:23
(0:28)
0:38
(0:00)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 127 127 127 127 122 107 69 53
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.054 0.091 0.023 0.116
p (model) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Left-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D 4:62
(0:28)
210:82
(0:06)
176:52
(0:20)
174:24
(0:23)
227:01
(0:04)
215:54
(0:20)
102:02
(0:66)
477:13
(0:14)
2D:4D2 {106:33
(0:06)
{89:03
(0:21)
{87:67
(0:24)
{115:02
(0:04)
{115:65
(0:18)
{50:24
(0:67)
{244:0
(0:14)
Female 0:45
(0:38)
1:28
(0:86)
{1:00
(0:83)
1:03
(0:82)
Fem.*2D:4D {0:86
(0:91)
0:70
(0:89)
{0:49
(0:92)
Risk Aver. 0:31
(0:00)
{2:56
(0:27)
0:24
(0:25)
0:34
(0:00)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 126 126 126 126 121 106 68 53
Pseudo-R2 0.003 0.006 0.067 0.013 0.040 0.075 0.016 0.077
p (model) 0.281 0.121 0.000 – – – 0.030 0.000
p-values in parentheses. Constants non-significant in (top male)(p = 0.6), (bottom a), (bottom c–d),
(bottom f), (bottom male), (female) (p.0.19), significant otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.t002
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The pairwise correlation between the behavior of subjects who
participated in both games is 0.327 (pv0:0002), positive but far
from 1. These differences may suggest that any relation found in
one of the periods should disappear in the other one. As we shall
see below, this is not the case.
Concerning gender, we observe no effect in 2010 (pw0:600
using t- and Wilcoxon unpaired rank-sum tests), but there seems to
be marginal gender effects in 2011 (p~0:126, and 0:082 for the
same tests, respectively). Men gave 0.79J less (50.4%), while
women passed 0.61J less to the Recipients (37.1%). Women
change the behavior slightly less, but this difference is not
statistically significant (pw0:230 for any test).
Digit Ratios
Males exhibit lower right-hand digit ratios (Male–Mean: 0:950;
St.Dev.: 0.031; Female–Mean: 0.966; St.Dev.: 0.033). This gender
effect is supported by any statistical test (pv0:002 for the t- and
Wilcoxon unpaired rank-sum tests). The average 2D:4D’s are
0.950 and 0.965 for men and women if we only consider
participants in both Dictator Games. This difference is again
significant (pv0:020). The reported distributions are statistically
indistinguishable from [27] for men, women and the pooled data.
This makes us confident that the observed population constitutes a
representative sample.
As for the left hands, the gender effects are weaker but in the
same direction. Males have lower 2D:4D’s if we consider the
whole sample at 6% (pv0:059 for the same tests; Male–Mean:
0:959; St.Dev.: 0.036; Female - Mean: 0.969; St.Dev.: 0.031).
However, they are not significant for the participants in both DG
sessions (0:20vpv0:23). The averages are 0:961 for males and
0.969 for females.
The correlations between the left and right 2D:4D are 0.657 in
2010 (N~170) and 0.661 (N~125); highly significant (pv0:0001)
but far from one. These correlations are the same for males and
females separately up to two decimals. Hence, the asymmetry does
not seem to be gender-specific.
Regression Analysis
Tables 1–3 show the estimation results of the 2010, 2011 and
the aggregated data for both right (top) and left hands (bottom),
while Table 4 provides results for the change of behavior from
2010 to 2011. Figure 2 summarizes the right-hand results
associating 2D:4D with giving in the two DGs and the change
of behavior.
Table 3. Dictator giving and 2D:4D, panel-data random-effects censored regression.
Right-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D 5:69
(0:05)
362:96
(0:01)
373:74
(0:01)
377:9
(0:01)
497:01
(0:00)
547:92
(0:00)
355:1
(0:10)
633:25
(0:00)
2D:4D2 {186:65
(0:01)
{192:76
(0:01)
{195:18
(0:01)
{258:59
(0:00)
{286:19
(0:00)
{183:84
(0:10)
{328:35
(0:00)
Female 0:25
(0:17)
{0:68
(0:90)
{2:4
(0:69)
{0:19
(0:98)
Fem.*2D:4D {0:97
(0:87)
2:74
(0:66)
0:57
(0:93)
Risk Aver. 0:17
(0:01)
{0:45
(0:81)
0:1
(0:29)
0:24
(0:00)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 171 171 171 171 149 107 88 61
p (model) 0.042 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.025 0.208 0.000
Left-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D 0:97
(0:30)
141:79
(0:00)
122:87
(0:00)
137:83
(0:00)
139:84
(0:00)
176:91
(0:00)
371:54
(0:03)
{2::61
(0:99)
2D:4D2 {72:71
(0:00)
{63:14
(0:00)
{71:79
(0:00)
{72:69
(0:00)
{92:41
(0:01)
{193:56
(0:03)
3:23
(0:98)
Female 0:19
(0:18)
{4:58
(0:11)
{4:1
(0:02)
{3:06
(0:26)
Fem.*2D:4D 4:93
(0:10)
4:42
(0:03)
3:45
(0:24)
Risk Aver. 0:09
(0)
{0:37
(0:80)
0:08
(0:40)
0:24
(0:01)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 170 170 170 170 148 106 87 61
p (model) 0.3 0.001 0.001 0 - - 0.117 0.039
p-values in parentheses. Constants non-reported: non-significant in (bottom a, top/bottom male) (p.0.18), significant otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.t003
Digit Ratio and Altruism
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The linear relationship is positive but non-significant in 2010 for
both hands (pw0:27), but once we introduce the squared 2D:4D
the estimates reveal a non-monotonic, concave association
between giving and 2D:4D: the most generous subjects have
intermediate 2D:4D. These results remain for both left and right
hands, if we estimate the models separately for men and women,
and are robust to inclusion of controls that have shown to be
related to altruism and/or the digit ratio in other studies. The
unique exception is the model for female left hands where we find
no significant association. In sum, the results are fairly robust to
different specifications, different subsamples, and left/right hands.
Since weaker left-hand effects are commonly observed in the
literature, it serves as an indication of the robustness of our
findings.
Since the behavior in DGs is generally sensitive to many details
[14], we further test these findings. We repeated the experiment in
2011 with the same subject pool and the findings are qualitatively
similar (Table 2), even though the subjects are significantly more
selfish (see Figure 1). The differences we find are: (i) the linear
relationship between giving and right-hand 2D:4D becomes
significant in 2011 (pv0:0001); (ii) the association gives up being
non-monotonic for male right-hand 2D:4D and turns out to be
linear (p~0:025; pseudo-R2~0:012; model p~0:025); and (iii)
the left-hand estimates are statistically weaker in 2011 than in
2010.
The conclusions are reinforced if we treat the data as a panel as
shown in Table 3. Hence, there is a robust non-monotonic
association between altruism and 2D:4D in our data.
Another interesting result is associated to learning; that is, how
subjects update their behavior. As illustrated in Table 4, the
2D:4D also exerts non-monotonic influence on the change of
behavior from 2010 to 2011 if we control for individual
heterogeneity. The linear relation is never significant, but adding
the squared 2D:4D results in lower p-values of the linear term. In
case of right hands, the linear and quadratic terms are jointly
significant at 10% in Model (d) and at 1% in Model (f), in which
we control for individual heterogeneity more systematically.
Subjects with intermediate right-hand 2D:4D, i.e. the most
Table 4. The change of behavior (giving2010{giving2011) and digit ratio, censored regressions.
Right-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D {1:92
(0:64)
134:96
(0:13)
120:44
(0:13)
126:98
(0:09)
114:60
(0:17)
212:47
(0:01)
154:32
(0:15)
62:56
(0:79)
2D:4D2 {71:78
(0:13)
{63:71
(0:14)
{67:42
(0:10)
{60:90
(0:18)
{109:63
(0:00)
{81:88
(0:14)
{33:5
(0:79)
Female {:23
(0:38)
{1:25
(0:48)
{:25
(0:93)
1:88
(0:72)
Fem. *2D:4D 1:07
(0:56)
0:04
(0:99)
{2:27
(0:68)
Risk Aver. {0:08
(0:10)
0:81
(0:74)
{0:01
(0:82)
{0:18
(0:00)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 125 125 125 125 120 105 67 53
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.040 0.003 0.031
p (model) 0.636 0.274 0.142 - - - 0.246 0.000
Left-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D {1:59
(0:74)
3:40
(0:97)
14:69
(0:88)
40:46
(0:72)
47:06
(0:67)
122:12
(0:53)
295:94
(0:00)
{544:86
(0:00)
2D:4D2 {2:58
(0:96)
{8:21
(0:87)
{22:76
(0:71)
{26:56
(0:65)
{67:19
(0:49)
{155:53
(0:00)
280:95
(0:00)
Female {0:20
(0:48)
{5:81
(0:18)
{7:68
(0:17)
{7:19
(0:33)
Fem. *2D:4D 5:82
(0:20)
7:76
(0:18)
7:17
(0:35)
Risk Aver. {0:11
(0:07)
0:60
(0:78)
{0:06
(0:32)
{0:13
(0:06)
Other Heterogen. No No No No No Yes No No
N 125 125 125 125 120 105 67 53
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.037 0.018 0.078
p (model) 0.744 0.947 0.889 - - - 0.000 0.000
p-values in parentheses. Constants non-reported: significant at 2% in all models except (top a) (p = 0.09), p.0.58 in (bottom a–f); p,0.0001 in (bottom male/female).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.t004
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generous subjects, tend to adjust their giving downwards more that
individuals with low and high 2D:4D’s. These results have to be
enjoyed with care though as 2D:4D does not exert influence on
giving in several of our model specifications.
Note that the relation is gender-specific in case of left hands.
The association remains inverted U-shaped for men, but for
women we find a highly significant U-shaped (rather than inverted
U-shaped) relation. This explains why we never observe significant
effects in the pooled estimations. As the dependent variable is not
statistically different across genders and women exhibit inverted
U-shaped association using right hands, we suspect that this result
has to do with the difference between left and right hands.
However, since it is not well understood how fetal hormones
manifest through left vs. right hands, we cannot interpret this
finding.
One may argue that an inverted U-shaped association can
potentially be an artifact of low sharing of subjects with high and
low 2D:4D’s in 2010 who simply might not be allowed to give any
less in 2011 given the design. Nevertheless, such an explanation
can be contrasted with the U-shaped association observed using
female left hands, even though female left-hand 2D:4D does not
seem to predict giving in the DG.
In addition, note that there are only 125 observations in Table 4.
We removed two male subjects with extremely much higher giving
in 2010 than in 2011, as their inclusion dramatically improves the
estimates. Nevertheless, since these results are highly sensitive to
the removal of these two outliers, we report the conservative and
more robust estimates in Table 4, which are robust to further
removals.
Males receive more prenatal testosterone and less oestrogen
than females, reflected in lower 2D:4D’s in men [25]. Hence, the
relation between 2D:4D and giving might potentially explain
gender effects observed in Dictator Games [28]. Regressing
Dictator giving in 2011 only on female dummy (and the constant
term) never leads to statistically significant effects of gender on
giving in our data (regressions not reported). Thus, the influence of
2D:4D on giving behavior is orthogonal to these gender effects
documented elsewhere and scholars cannot capture the detected
biological predisposition by controlling for gender.
Discussion
We provide support for the hypothesis that 2D:4D may predict
altruistic behavior. This is implied by the non-monotonic
association we find between 2D:4D and giving in Dictator game.
Table 5. Dictator giving and the deviation from the population median of the 2D:4D censored regressions.
Right-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D-2gD : 4 D {12:91
(0:02)
{17:66
(0:01)
23:04
(0:11)
23:28
(0:15)
(2D:4D-2gD : 4 D)2 {520:14
(0:01)
{614:27
(0:01)
{221:62
(0:00)
{300:43
(0:00)
{283:26
(0:01)
{280:78
(0:01)
Female 2:75
(0:55)
5:05
(0:27)
4:28
(0:34)
Fem. *2D:4D {2:64
(0:58)
{5:01
(0:29)
{4:22
(0:37)
Risk Aver. 0:07
(0:31)
0:08
(0:28)
0:08
(0:28)
0:03
(0:74)
0:11
(0:21)
N 171 149 171 149 171 149 88 61
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.025 0.026 0.040 0.022 0.036 0.020 0.078
p (model) 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.044 0.004
Left-hand digit ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (male) (female)
2D:4D-2gD : 4 D {10:55
(0:03)
{11:58
(0:03)
8:82
(0:54)
12:38
(0:41)
(2D:4D-2gD : 4 D)2 {272:45
(0:17)
{338:02
(0:1)
{161:24
(0:02)
{182:25
(0:01)
{188:39
(0:01)
188:39
(0:01)
Female {5:45
(0:25)
{7:02
(0:16)
{6:41
(0:20)
Fem. *2D:4D 5:76
(0:24)
7:38
(0:15)
6:74
(0:19)
Risk Aver. 0:04
(0:59)
0:04
(0:61)
0:04
(0:62)
0:15
(0:91)
0:15
(0:25)
N 170 148 170 148 170 148 87 61
Pseudo-R2 0.010 0.017 0.014 0.023 0.014 0.021 0.043 0.031
p (model) 0.029 0.12 0.044 0.068 0.015 0.050 0.003 0.036
p-values in parentheses. Constants at 1% in all models except (top d) (p = 0.028) and (bottom female) (p = 0.25).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.t005
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In contrast to the 2D:4D literature that reports important
differences between men and women and between right and left
hands, our findings are for the most part robust to these issues.
Our results corroborate the idea that part of the variation of
human altruism is already determined by prenatal events. This
sugests that biological and genetic factors play an important role in
social norm transmission (as much as cultural transmission and
socialization). Our results are in line with the analysis of Benjamin
et al. [8] who conclude that the genetic variation in behavioral
traits will most likely be explained by many factors with each
having a small effect. The McFadden’s pseudo-R2 from the 2010
estimations suggest that 2D:4D alone explains 2.3% of the
individual variation in giving, while gender improves the fit by
0.2% and controlling for heterogeneity more systematically leads
to final 6.5%. The absolute numbers should be treated with
caution and interpreted relatively, due to the general difficulties of
interpreting the pseudo-R2 [47]. For comparison, 2D:4D has
relatively similar effects in ordinary least-squares estimations of the
same models. The R2’s are 0.059 (compared to 0.023 in the
censored regressions), 0.064 (compared to 0.025 while controlling
for gender) and 0.1658 (compared to 0.065 while controlling for
heterogeneity more systematically).
Note that our analysis differs from other studies relating
prosocial behavior and biological factors such as circulating
hormones [48] or oxytocin [49]. Their levels are endogenous,
complicating causality assessments. That is why we chose to work
with the exposure to prenatal sex hormones, since they are not
systematically related to their circulating counterparts [50].
We would like to emphasize that the degree of exposure to
prenatal sex hormones and thus 2D:4D ratio, as much as any
other biological traits in humans and non-humans [10–12], has
most likely been tuned by thousands years of evolution till it has
reached an ‘‘optimal’’ level. Does the distance from the mean
predict a subjects’ adherence to a desirable sharing norm?
We address this question in the following manner. We combine
our data with a large distribution of digit ratios of individuals from
another study. This is gives us a total of 1017 observations (577
females) (see Methods). The right-hand 2D:4D’s that maximize
giving in 2010 (before subjects learn and may know the other
participants) are 0.956 and 0.961 for men and women, respectively
Figure 1. Dictator Giving in October 2010 and May 2011. Left: 2010. Mean: 1.62, St.Dev.: 0.99, Median: 2, N~171 (76 females). Right: 2011.
Mean: 0.89, St.Dev.: 0.97, Median: 1, N~127 (58 females).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.g001
Figure 2. The estimated relation. Dictator’s giving in 2010 (solid),
2011 (dashed) and updating of behavior from 2010 to 2011 (dotted) on
y-axis and 2D:4D (x-axis); censored regression analysis; right hands.
Est imated results : ( i ) 2010: y~300:3x2{573:1x, ( i i ) 2011:
y~213:5x2{416:4x, (iii) 2010–2011: y~109:63x2{212:47x. The re-
ported estimations control for heterogeneity; control variables are held
at their averages.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060419.g002
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(see Figure 2). These figures are very close to 0.957 and 0.969, the
proxies for the median 2D:4D’s in the population.
We further provide a more rigorous test. We estimate the
relation between giving and (the absolute value of) the deviation
from the above population medians. The linear term is significant
on its own in Table 5. However, the best model in terms of model
significance, adjusted-R2, and p-values associated to 2D:4D
variables (pv0:02) turns out to be regressing giving over the
quadratic term for both hands. Controlling for heterogeneity in
this model reinforces this conclusion. With one exception, we
observe a decreasing concave association, suggesting that the
higher the distance from the optimal value the lower the giving,
but at a decreasing rate. Hence, the distance from the median
2D:4D relates negatively to the observed sharing behavior. We
find the contrary - increasing convex association - for deviations of
female left-hand 2D:4D’s from the population median.
One possible interpretation of the above findings comes from
stabilizing selection. Since sharing with others is socially beneficial,
selfish individuals are socially excluded and their fitness affected
negatively. If individuals who are exposed too much or too little do
not share with others, there is an evolutionary pressure on these
non-altruistic individuals, which in turn generates an indirect
evolutionary pressures on the degree of exposure to prenatal sex
hormones by raising survival probabilities of individuals with
intermediate levels of exposure. This hypothesis is supported by
observed distributions of 2D:4D in the literature, which are
universally concentrated around the median values [25].
Even though the previous paragraphs provide certain support
for our hypothesis, a word of caution is in place here. First, our
results are rather suggestive. They only provide one piece of
evidence to support such argument and cannot be taken as
conclusive evidence of stabilizing selection. Other explanations are
obviously possible. Second, we know that exposure to fetal
testosterone and oestrogen conditions many behavioral and
physical traits in humans (not only sharing behavior). The
2D:4D optimal from the evolutionary perspective (if it exists)
could thus be confounded with effects on these traits and potential
trade-offs have to be taken into account. Therefore, we have to be
wary of making general conclusions based on our exercise. On the
other hand, some studies have already suggested non-monotonic
impacts of 2D:4D on some behavioral outcomes (e.g.
[13,40,51,52]).
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